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This paper attempts to reconcile critics and defenders of
inclusive fitness by constructing a synthesis that does justice
to the insights of both. I argue that criticisms of the regression-
based version of Hamilton’s rule, although they undermine its
use for predictive purposes, do not undermine its use as an
organizing framework for social evolution research. I argue that
the assumptions underlying the concept of inclusive fitness,
conceived as a causal property of an individual organism, are
unlikely to be exactly true in real populations, but they are
approximately true given a specific type of weak selection that
Hamilton took, on independent grounds, to be responsible
for the cumulative assembly of complex adaptation. Finally, I
reflect on the uses and limitations of ‘design thinking’ in social
evolution research.
1. Introduction
The debate about the foundations of inclusive fitness theory
that has followed in the wake of Nowak, Tarnita & Wilson’s [1]
critique has been remarkably polarizing. After several rounds of
rebuttals and replies, there is still little evidence of any serious
reconciliation between the theory’s critics [2–10] and its defenders
[11–24]. It doesn’t have to be this way. I believe that, on the main
points of disagreement, it is possible to find a way forward that
does justice to the insights of both camps. My aim in this paper is
to find that way forward.
2. Kin selection, Hamilton’s rule and
inclusive fitness
The concepts of kin selection, Hamilton’s rule and inclusive fitness
are often run together. They are, to be sure, closely related, but
they should be distinguished [21,25]. Here is how I will use these
concepts in this paper.
2017 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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2.1. Kin selection
Kin selection is a process that occurs in nature: a variety of natural selection in which the direction of
evolutionary change is affected by correlated interaction between genetic relatives. It is something that
happens out there in the world, independently of the methods social evolution theorists may invent to
analyse it, and independently of the controversies theorists may have about these methods [17,23,26].
I will not discuss the empirical evidence for kin selection in this paper [12,13,20]. Ultimately, I do not
think the current controversies surrounding inclusive fitness and related ideas are primarily empirical
debates about the existence, or otherwise, of kin selection. Both sides accept that kin selection occurs
[27,28]. There are empirical disagreements about the importance of kin selection in explaining particular
biological phenomena, such as the evolution of eusociality [8,14,22], but I do not see these debates about
particular biological phenomena as the core of the controversy. At its core, this is a controversy not
about the existence of kin selection, but about the explanatory value of the conceptual and theoretical
framework Hamilton [29–32] constructed to make sense of it. This framework has two key ingredients:
Hamilton’s rule and inclusive fitness.
2.2. Hamilton’s rule
Hamilton’s rule is a mathematical condition for positive change in the frequency of a trait in a population
undergoing natural selection, expressed in terms of three population statistics defined with reference to
that trait: relatedness (r), benefit (b) and cost (c). The rule states that a trait will undergo positive change
due to natural selection if and only if rb − c > 0 [29].
In its most general, regression-based form [17,33], the rule is a highly abstract result that applies not
only to cases of kin selection in the above sense but to all cases of natural selection, including those cases
in which r = 0 and those cases in which r > 0 due to causes, such as ‘greenbeard’ mechanisms [34,35], that
do not rely on correlated interaction between biological kin in the ordinary sense of the word. Because
of its highly abstract nature, there is room for legitimate debate as to what, if anything, Hamilton’s rule
explains about social evolution, and I will consider this question in §3.
2.3. Inclusive fitness
Inclusive fitness, as Hamilton [30] conceived it, is a property of an individual organism, defined as a
weighted sum of the effects on reproductive success it causes by means of its behaviour. The weights are
coefficients of relatedness. The term has sometimes taken on other meanings, and other authors prefer
to use the term ‘inclusive fitness’ to refer to a property of a trait, strategy or lineage [36–38]. But for
Hamilton, it was a property of an individual organism (see §4).
It is, at first sight, a strange quantity (see §4). Yet, Hamilton regarded it as the best way of thinking
about the fitness of an organism in the context of social evolution, and his successors in what we might
call the Hamiltonian tradition in social evolution theory, such as Grafen, Gardner and West, tend to agree
[39–41]. They claim inclusive fitness is uniquely able to capture the design objective of social adaptation—
the goal towards which all social adaptation is directed. I consider this claim in §§4 and 5.
3. The status of Hamilton’s rule
3.1. What the critics get right
There are various formulations of Hamilton’s rule, and the different versions attach different meanings
to the cost, benefit and relatedness coefficients [23,42,43]. The current controversy has predominantly
centred on the generalized, regression-based version first formulated by Queller [33], in which
relatedness is a regression coefficient capturing the statistical association between the genotypes of social
partners, and cost and benefit are partial regression coefficients in a regression model of reproductive
success. I have elsewhere called this version HRG (G for both general and genic) [42].
Critics of HRG point out, correctly, that the rule in this generalized, regression-based form is general
because it is tautology-like [2,7]. The rule says, roughly speaking, that the evolutionary change under
one, coarse-grained description is positive if and only if the evolutionary change under another, finer-
grained description is also positive. The coarse-grained description is simply the overall change in the
frequency of a gene, or in the mean value of a polygenic character. The finer-grained description uses
a regression model to partition the overall change into an rb component that captures indirect fitness
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effects and a−c component that captures direct fitness effects. The rule simply notes an equivalence
between two different ways of describing change, without making any detailed assumptions about the
causes of change.
By way of analogy, it is akin to saying that a candidate wins a US presidential election if and only if
that candidate wins more than 269 votes in the electoral college: the result, described in general terms, is
equivalent to the result described at a finer grain of analysis [4]. This is why (although a few assumptions
are required) Hamilton’s rule can be said to be ‘as general as the genetical theory of natural selection
itself’ [11].
As a consequence, HRG is not much use for prediction, as Allen et al. [7] correctly note. If one has
the information necessary to calculate the relatedness, cost and benefit coefficients in HRG exactly (i.e.
complete information about the genotypic values, fitness values and social interactions in the target
population), then one also has the information necessary to calculate the exact response to selection
directly. Prediction does not come into it. The change under one, finer-grained description cannot be
said to predict the change under another, coarser-grained description, any more than a state-by-state
breakdown of an election result can be said to predict the overall result.
Alternative versions of Hamilton’s rule invoke stronger assumptions, and these versions, not HRG,
should be used for predictive purposes. In particular, an approximate, ‘marginal’ version that replaces
the partial regression coefficients with partial derivatives of a fitness function can be used to derive
predictions about evolutionary stable strategies [44–46].
Allen et al. [7] are also justified in their assertion that HRG does not, by itself, provide causal
explanations of evolutionary change. Regression coefficients capture statistical associations, and
statistical association is not causation [47–50]. To explain change causally, it is not enough to know the
values of the population statistics r, b and c. These population statistics mathematically imply changes in
gene frequency (just as the state-by-state breakdown mathematically implies the national result), but
they do not cause those changes (any more than the state-by-state breakdown causes the national result).
For a causal explanation, one also needs to know the evolutionary dynamics causally responsible for the
values of r, b and c, including, where applicable, the population structure and the payoff structure of
social interaction.
For example, positive relatedness (r > 0) in a population may be explained by underlying assortative
processes as diverse as kin discrimination, limited dispersal, shared habitat preference, recognition
of greenbeard-like phenotypic markers, or even, in microbes, gene mobility, and the way in which
positive relatedness is generated can make a difference to the evolutionary stability of a social trait
[32,35,41,51–54]. In any particular scenario in which relatedness is found to be positive, a satisfactory
causal explanation of change should thus cite the causes of positive relatedness; if the aim is to elucidate
the causal processes driving change, it is not enough to state merely that relatedness is positive without
saying why. The same can be said of cost and benefit.
3.2. What the defenders get right
In spite of all this, I maintain that HRG is a useful and important result. This is because it provides an
organizing framework that helps us structure our thinking about the causes of social evolution [55]. An
organizing framework is not in competition with detailed models of particular ecological scenarios. It is
intended to provide us with a helpful way of interpreting, classifying and comparing such models.
The idea is that, by partitioning change into two biologically meaningful components (rb and –c),
HRG provides an organizing framework that is distinctively valuable for social evolution research. What
it does, in essence, is provide a scheme for categorizing causal explanations of evolutionary change. Any
causal explanation of change in a particular trait, whether it takes the form of a detailed mathematical
model or an informal verbal account, will have implied or explicit commitments regarding the costs and
benefits of the trait and the relatedness between social partners. HRG provides a way of categorizing
explanations by these commitments; for it shows that all causal explanations of positive change, in any
character and in any population, must fall into one of four broad categories, depending on the signs of
rb and c. These categories can be visualized in terms of a space of explanations (figure 1).
First, there are indirect fitness explanations, for which rb > 0 and c ≥ 0. These explanations cite a cause of
relatedness to explain why the direct fitness costs associated with a trait (i.e. costs to the actor) are offset
by indirect fitness benefits (i.e. benefits to related recipients). Second, there are direct fitness explanations,
for which c < 0 and rb ≤ 0. These explanations show how, over the lifetime of the actor, the trait yields
direct fitness benefits, so that no indirect benefits are required. Third, there are hybrid explanations that
appeal to both direct and indirect fitness effects as drivers of positive change, and for which rb > 0
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Figure 1. Partitioning the space of explanations. HRG allows us to distinguish four broad classes of explanation of positive evolutionary
change in a social trait, defined by their commitments regarding the values of rb and c. All explanations of positive change lie somewhere
in this space. The corresponding space for negative change is an inversion of this space (with O as the centre of inversion). (Reprinted
from Birch [55] (Copyright© 2017, the author).)
and c < 0. Fourth, there are partially or wholly non-selective explanations that appeal to a process other
than fitness differences between organisms. Such processes may include drift, migration, mutation,
environmental change or forms of within-organism selection such as gametic selection or meiotic drive
(formally, these are processes captured in the ‘transmission bias’ term in the Price equation and in Frank’s
‘exact-total’ version of Hamilton’s rule; [45,56,57]). HRG tells us that, if rb ≤ c, any adequate explanation
of positive change must appeal to at least one such process.
The insight embodied by HRG is that every adequate causal explanation of positive change can be
placed somewhere in this space. It also shows how the space of possible explanations is constrained by
adding information about cost, benefit and relatedness. For example, if a trait is known to be costly
in the technical sense that it detracts from the lifetime reproductive success of the actor (implying
positive c), HRG tells us that an adequate causal explanation of positive change in that trait must
appeal either to indirect fitness effects or else to non-selective processes, because direct fitness effects
alone are not sufficient. These are insights that are obvious once one understands HRG, but far from
obvious otherwise.
We can use this organizing framework as the basis for a more detailed taxonomy of explanations of
change [48]. For example, indirect fitness explanations can be classified at a finer grain by the causes
of relatedness they cite (e.g. kin discrimination or limited dispersal). Direct fitness explanations can be
classified at a finer grain by the nature of the causal pathway that positively links the behaviour to the
lifetime reproductive success of the actor, which may involve immediate returns, or may be mediated
by reciprocity, punishment or reward. In this way, HRG structures the way social evolution theorists
think about the causes of social evolution, shaping research programmes and allowing for overarching
syntheses of diverse results [19,57–60].
Importantly, this organizing role of HRG is not undermined by the examples Allen et al. construct to
challenge its predictive and causal-explanatory utility [7]. For instance, Allen et al. describe a scenario in
which a ‘hanger-on’ trait causes its bearers to seek out and interact with individuals of high fitness. This
leads to an association between an organism’s fitness and the behaviour of its social partner, implying
positive b, yet the hanger-on trait makes no causal contribution to fitness. Such examples show that one
should be wary of interpreting b and c as measures of direct causal influence. However, they are not
(and are not intended to be) counter-examples to HRG, and they do not show that HRG misclassifies
explanations of change. The scenario Allen et al. describe is one in which rb = c, so the categorization
scheme in figure 1 implies, correctly, that any positive change in the hanger-on trait must be explained
by a non-selective process.
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The best way to challenge the use of HRG as an organizing framework is not to construct counter-
examples (because all sides agree that it is a correct mathematical result), but to argue that a different
partition of change provides a more useful or biologically insightful categorization scheme [55]. Here,
the defender of HRG should concede that it is certainly not the only possible organizing framework
for social evolution research. The Price equation (from which HRG is derived) can be regarded as
providing an organizing framework at an even coarser grain of analysis: it simply partitions change into
a component due to natural selection and a component due to transmission bias, without partitioning
the change due to natural selection into any further components [61–63]. HRG, by partitioning the
change due to selection at a finer grain of analysis than the Price equation, is particularly useful for
organizing explanations of social evolution. One notable rival to HRG in this respect is the framework
of multilevel selection theory [32,56,64,65]. This too can be seen as a framework that organizes our
thinking about the causes of social evolution by partitioning the space of explanations. This is not the
place for a detailed comparison of the two frameworks (see [43,55]), but one important limitation of
the multilevel framework, at least in the version developed by Price, is worth emphasizing: it only
applies in populations that have a certain kind of structure, whereby the population is subdivided into
objective, discrete and social groups. A distinctive advantage of HRG is that it still holds regardless of
the population structure.
3.3. The way forward
HRG has been criticized for being an ‘empty statement’ or tautology, for failing to yield predictions
of change, and for failing to yield causal explanations of change. There is some justification for all of
these charges, but they do not undermine the use of HRG as an organizing framework: a framework for
interpreting, comparing and classifying more detailed evolutionary models.
It is a virtue of an organizing framework that it operates at a high level of abstraction, invoking few
assumptions: this makes it compatible with a wide range of underlying models, while also allowing
us to make biologically meaningful comparisons between those models. For example, it allows us to
see that, for all their underlying differences, models of the evolution of costly social behaviour by natural
selection must invoke a cause of relatedness, such as kin discrimination, limited dispersal, shared habitat
preference, greenbeard effects or gene mobility.
There is room for a productive debate regarding the value of HRG in comparison to other possible
organizing frameworks, such as multilevel selection theory. Progress on this issue can be made by
identifying the properties we value in an organizing framework (such as its compatibility with different
possible population structures), and by evaluating the extent to which different frameworks possess
these properties.
4. The status of inclusive fitness
Hamilton’s rule is a statistical, population-level result. Inclusive fitness, by contrast, is an explicitly causal
property of an individual organism. Here is how Hamilton defined inclusive fitness:
Inclusive fitness may be imagined as the personal fitness which an individual actually expresses in
its production of adult offspring as it becomes after it has been stripped and augmented in a certain
way. It is stripped of all components which can be considered as due to the individual’s social
environment, leaving the fitness he would express if not exposed to any of the harms or benefits of
that environment. This quantity is then augmented by certain fractions of the quantities of harm
and benefit which the individual himself causes to the fitness of his neighbours. The fractions in
question are simply the coefficients of relationship. [30, p. 8]
As noted above, there are other theorists who think about inclusive fitness differently: Queller, for
example, has argued that we should think of inclusive fitness as a property of a trait or strategy rather
than an individual [36], and Akçay & van Cleve argue that we should think of it as a property of a
lineage [37]. But we can see clearly that, for Hamilton himself, inclusive fitness was, first and foremost,
a property of an individual. We can, of course, talk of the mean inclusive fitness of a population, or of
the bearers of a particular trait. But these averages are derivative notions: the fundamental notion is a
property of an individual. It also could not be clearer that inclusive fitness, as Hamilton conceived it, is
inherently causal: it is a weighted sum of the effects on reproductive success for which the focal organism
is causally responsible (figure 2).
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Figure 2. Inclusive fitness. An individual organism’s inclusive fitness is a weighted sum of the effects of its behaviour on reproductive
success. In this illustration, organism 1’s behaviour affects the reproductive success of itself and of organisms 2, 3 and 4 (as shown by the
arrows; the shaded regions represent components of reproductive success caused by the behaviour of organism 1). Organism 1’s inclusive
fitness consists of a baseline non-social component, plus the effect on its own reproductive success caused by its own behaviour, plus its
effects on organisms 2, 3 and 4, weighted in each case by the relevant coefficient of relatedness. In a population without class structure,
the coefficient of relatedness will be the same for every social partner and will correspond to the r coefficient in HRG (for discussion of
cases in which class structure is present, see [39,45,46]). (Reprinted from Birch [55] (Copyright© 2017, the author).)
4.1. What the critics get right
Critics of inclusive fitness argue that it is committed, at a conceptual level, to the validity of an additive
causal model of fitness [1,7]. They are right about this. The procedure Hamilton describes in the above
paragraph involves crediting components of reproductive output to the actors whose social behaviour
was causally responsible for them, rather than crediting them to the organisms that actually produced
the offspring. For example, the larvae produced by a queen in a social insect colony should be credited
not to the queen but to the workers who rear them. If this procedure is to avoid problems of double-
counting, it must be that the reproductive success of an organism can be written as a sum of components,
each of which is attributable to the social behaviour of a single social actor. Let us call this assumption
fitness additivity. Moreover, it must be that the value of each component depends only on the genotype of
the actor, and not on the genotype of the recipient, an assumption known as actor’s control [39].
The assumptions of fitness additivity and actor’s control are essential for inclusive fitness, conceived
as a property of an individual organism, to make sense. Grafen, for example, writes that ‘the question
of how to define inclusive fitness in the absence of additivity has not been settled, and so fundamental
theory on the non-additive case can hardly yet begin’ [39, p. 544]. Thus, the reliance of inclusive fitness,
as Hamilton conceived it, on fitness additivity and actor’s control is something even its most committed
defenders should acknowledge. Note here that, by contrast, the population-level result HRG has been
applied to cases of non-additive payoffs. Regardless of the causal structure of social interaction, one can
always use a regression model to partition change at the population level into an rb component and a −c
component [17,33,42,43,59]. This, however, is not the same as defining inclusive fitness qua property of
an individual organism in the non-additive case. Grafen rightly identifies this as a genuine problem.
The critics proceed to argue that there are many biologically plausible ways in which violations of
these assumptions can arise. They are right about this too, although the point is not new: authors in
the social evolution literature have made it repeatedly [66–69]. Consider, for example, a genotype that
disposes its bearer to produce an alarm call. In so doing, it reveals the organism’s location to nearby
predators, adversely affecting its ability to benefit from the alarm calls of others. In this scenario, the
benefit of receiving an alarm call for a recipient does not just depend on the genotype of the actor. It also
depends on a fact about the recipient (i.e. whether or not the recipient has also produced an alarm call)
that is sensitive to its genotype. Actor’s control is violated.
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Defenders of inclusive fitness should accept this too. Fitness additivity and actor’s control are
strong assumptions, and they are unlikely to be exactly true in real populations. In fact, Grafen does
acknowledge this, writing, for example, that ‘the assumption of additivity is made throughout this paper,
but is not in general a realistic assumption. In many applications, non-additivity is an important part of
the problem’ [39, p. 543]. The critics may reply, with some justification, that this point is absent from
some of the more forthright defences of inclusive fitness [11].
4.2. What the defenders get right
Critics of inclusive fitness are likely to feel that the discussion should end here: because inclusive fitness
makes strong assumptions that are often violated in real populations, we should stop using it as a
fitness concept. For example, Allen & Nowak [9] conclude from the unrealistic nature of the additivity
assumption that ‘there is no inclusive fitness at the level of the individual’. Yet, despite all of the above,
I think a good case can be made for the theoretical value of inclusive fitness, conceived as a property of
an individual.
4.2.1. Weak selection and Fisher’s microscope
Defenders of inclusive fitness have often noted that its assumptions can be justified as approximations if
we assume a specific form of weak selection, usually known as δ-weak selection [39,70–72]. To assume
δ-weak selection is to assume that the character of interest is a quantitative character, and that the
alternatives competing in the population are a wild-type and a mutant that differs only very slightly
from the wild-type. For example, a δ-weak selection model of an alarm call scenario might pit a wild-
type strategy in which an organism makes an alarm call with probability q against a mutant strategy in
which an organism makes an alarm call with probability q + δ, where δ is a very small increment such
that δ2 ≈ 0 [72].
With this assumption in place, we can reinterpret inclusive fitness in terms of marginal (or differential)
causal effects, attributable to small deviations from the wild-type, rather than total causal effects. In other
words, instead of defining an actor’s inclusive fitness as a baseline component plus a weighted sum of
the total effects of its behaviour on reproductive success, we instead define an actor’s inclusive fitness
as a baseline component plus a weighted sum of the differential effects of its behaviour on reproductive
success relative to a default scenario in which the actor expresses the wild-type behaviour. All effects
common to the mutant and wild-type are thus folded into the baseline component of fitness. On this
marginal interpretation, fitness additivity and actor’s control can be reinterpreted as assumptions about
marginal effects: what is assumed is that the marginal effects of the mutant phenotype, relative to the
wild-type, are additive and actor controlled.
The upshot is that the assumptions that initially seemed too strong are now reasonable as
approximations. To see the intuitive rationale for this, consider again the alarm call example. The problem
here was that making an alarm call reduces the benefit an organism receives from an alarm call expressed
in others, leading to a violation of actor’s control. But now consider the marginal effect of making an
alarm call with probability q + δ rather than probability q. This will have a first-order effect (proportional
to δ) on one’s own reproductive success and on the reproductive success of nearby recipients. It will also
have a second-order effect (proportional to δ2) on the benefit one receives from a very small increase in
the probability with which another nearby individual makes an alarm call. However, this second-order
effect, which is the source of the trouble for the actor’s control assumption, is precisely the kind of effect
that the assumption of δ-weak selection entitles us to regard as approximately 0, because it relies on the
product of two tiny phenotypic differences.
To the critics, the appeal to δ-weak selection here will seem ad hoc: to justify two questionable
assumptions, we invoke another assumption that seems no less questionable [1,7]. Why think that
selection is usually δ-weak? Why think it is ever δ-weak? However, I do not see this as an ad hoc
assumption. It is fairer, I think, to see it as an assumption grounded in some important background
commitments of inclusive fitness theory—commitments that can be traced back to Hamilton, but which
critics of inclusive fitness do not necessarily share.
At the heart of the Hamiltonian tradition is a version of adaptationism that takes complex adaptation,
or ‘organism design’, to be the explanatory target of social evolution research [40,73]. This is combined
with an empirical commitment to a gradualist picture of how complex adaptation arises. Fisher, a major
influence on Hamilton, took complex adaptation to result from the gradual accumulation of mutations
with tiny phenotypic effects (Darwin was also a gradualist, but the picture of adaptation arising through
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the accumulation of small-effect mutations is properly credited to Fisher) [74]. Fisher posited small-
effect mutations on the grounds that large-effect mutations are much less likely to cause adaptive
improvements. In support of this, he offered two iconic arguments: one involving an informal analogy
with a microscope and the other involving a more formal geometric model.
To paraphrase (and simplify) the informal argument, suppose you are attempting to focus a
microscope by turning an adjustment knob. Knowing nothing of microscopes, you have no idea which
way to turn the knob, so you turn it in a random direction. If the adjustment is very small, there is
a 50% chance it will improve the focus, because any very small adjustment in the right direction will
help. But the larger the adjustment gets, the lower the probability it will be an improvement, because it
becomes ever more likely that an adjustment, even if it happens to be in the right direction, will overshoot
the target.
Using a geometric model in which a population is displaced from the optimum in phenotypic space
and must find its way back to the optimum through random gene substitutions, Fisher showed that
the probability of an improvement, which falls off with the size of the adjustment even in the one-
dimensional case, falls off more rapidly in the case of an adjustment in two dimensions and falls off
very rapidly indeed when we are adjusting at random in many dimensions, as in the case of a mutation
that affects many aspects of the phenotype. The chance of improvement is greatest, at 50%, for a mutation
that affects the phenotype by an infinitesimal amount.
Fisher’s argument has not been without its critics. Kimura argued that, in finite populations, mutants
with larger effects on the phenotype have a greater chance of going to fixation, because mutants with
small effects are prone to drifting out of existence [75]. Orr showed that both Fisher and Kimura could be
partially vindicated in relation to different stages of the process of cumulative adaptation: the typical
effect size of a mutation fixed at an early stage in the process, when the phenotype is far from the
optimum, is much larger than Fisher thought; but, as the phenotype gets closer to optimality, Fisher’s
concern about overshooting becomes increasingly salient and the typical effect size of a fixed mutation
becomes progressively smaller [76].
Although Fisher’s argument remains a source of debate [77,78], what matters for our purposes is that
a commitment to Fisherian gradualism is at the heart of Hamilton’s theory of social evolution. Consider,
for example, the following credo from Hamilton’s collected papers:
I was and still am a Darwinian gradualist for most of the issues of evolutionary change. Most
change comes, I believe, through selected alleles that make small modifications to existing structure
and behaviour. If one could understand just this case in social situations, who cared much what
might happen in the rare cases where the gene changes were great and happened not to be
disastrous? Whether under social or classical selection, defeat and disappearance would, as always,
be the usual outcome of genes that cause large changes. I think that a lot of the objection to
so-called ‘reductionism’ and ‘bean-bag reasoning’ directed at Neodarwinist theory comes from
people who, whether through inscrutable private agendas or ignorance, are not gradualists, being
instead inhabitants of some imagined world of super-fast progress. Big changes, strong interlocus
interactions, hopeful monsters, mutations so abundant and so hopeful that several may be under
selection at one time—these have to be the stuff of their dreams if their criticisms are to make sense.
[79, pp. 27–28]
Thus, a focus on δ-weak selection is grounded in the core commitments of Hamilton’s programme.
The subset of selection processes for which inclusive fitness is a valid fitness concept is the same
subset Hamilton and his successors take, on independent grounds, to be responsible for the cumulative
assembly of complex adaptations.
4.2.2. Inclusive fitness as a criterion for improvement
There is more to be said, however, about the connection between inclusive fitness and cumulative
adaptive evolution. The fact that inclusive fitness is a valid fitness concept under δ-weak selection does
not give it any advantage over other valid fitness concepts. But, in the context of explaining cumulative
adaptation, there is a different theoretical role for a fitness concept with respect to which inclusive fitness
is distinctively valuable: that of providing a criterion for phenotypic improvement.
Suppose we are trying to explain the evolution of a complex adaptation through the gradual
accumulation of tiny improvements to the phenotype. Talk of improvement implies a standard with
respect to which improvement can be judged. In this context, we want more from a fitness concept than
accurate calculations of short-term gene frequency change and short-term equilibria. We also want a
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fitness concept that can provide a stable criterion, throughout the whole process, for what constitutes
an improvement to the phenotype. In other words, we want a property of an organism, X, such that
new mutants are systematically favoured over the wild-type if and only if they make a positive causal
contribution (in contrast with the wild-type) to X. The distinctive advantage of inclusive fitness over
other fitness concepts is that it is a good candidate for property X.
To see why, imagine a process of social evolution in which natural selection gradually shapes
various different aspects of a complex social strategy involving the conditional expression of different
actions in different contexts. In one context, C1, the strategy produces actions that benefit the actor; in
another context, C2, the strategy produces actions that confer benefits on genetically related recipients.
Mutants periodically arise (one at a time) that alter some aspect of the strategy very slightly, implying
δ-weak selection.
Suppose natural selection targets different aspects of the phenotype at different times: the strategy is
initially shaped by selection for enhanced benefits for the actor in C1, then goes through a stage in which
it is shaped by selection for greater benefits conferred on genetically related recipients in C2, and then
finally goes through a streamlining stage in which the cost to the actor of conferring benefits on relatives
in C2 is gradually reduced. A more realistic scenario would involve the shaping of all these aspects of
the phenotype as and when relevant mutants arise; but, for the purpose of fixing ideas, it helps to think
of selection targeting different aspects in discrete stages.
At all stages in this hypothetical process, the actor’s inclusive fitness provides a criterion for
improvement: all and only those mutants that causally promote (in contrast to the wild-type) the
inclusive fitness of the actor are favoured. The same cannot be said of the actor’s reproductive success,
because mutants that detract from this quantity are favoured during the middle stage; nor can it be said
of the recipient’s reproductive success, because mutants that may be neutral or deleterious with respect
to this quantity are favoured in the initial and final stages.
The cumulative assembly of social adaptations through δ-weak selection thus constitutes a special
context in which inclusive fitness is both valid and valuable. It is valid because its assumptions are
reasonable as approximations when selection is δ-weak. It is valuable because, unlike other fitness
concepts, it provides a stable criterion for what constitutes an improvement as natural selection shapes
different aspects of the phenotype.
4.3. The way forward
The assumptions of inclusive fitness are empirically questionable if interpreted as exact claims about
total effects. However, they can be justified as approximations regarding marginal effects under δ-weak
selection, which is to say selection on tiny differences between the mutant and the wild-type. The
assumption of δ-weak selection is grounded in a methodological stance that takes complex adaptation
to be the explanatory target of social evolution research, together with an empirical commitment to a
gradualist picture on which complex adaptation arises through the accumulation of small improvements.
In the context of a process of cumulative adaptive evolution by δ-weak selection for small improvements,
inclusive fitness has a distinctive role to play as the criterion for improvement.
5. Selection, design and optimality
This special issue provides an opportunity to reflect not only on the mathematical foundations of
inclusive fitness theory, but also on its connections to questions of purpose, design and optimality in the
natural world. Here too, we find that the two opposing camps in the current controversy hold radically
different views.
5.1. One extreme
Defenders of inclusive fitness are, for the most part, adaptationists who regard natural selection as a
powerful generator of phenotypic optimality. Here, we should distinguish two types of adaptationism.
We noted above that inclusive fitness theorists take complex adaptation (or ‘organism design’) to be their
main explanatory target. Because this is a methodological choice, rather than a claim about nature, it is a
version of methodological adaptationism [80,81]. This should be distinguished from the claim that natural
selection has a robust tendency to generate phenotypic optimality, and that we should therefore expect
organisms to behave as if at least approximately optimizing their inclusive fitness. This is a claim about
nature, and it is therefore a version of empirical adaptationism [80,81].
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I am sceptical of the second, stronger form of adaptationism [82,83]. The issue is a complex one, but
for current purposes it is sufficient to note that the ability of natural selection to produce cumulative
improvement depends on many variables, including the stability of the environment, the strength of
other evolutionary causes such as drift and the genetic architecture underlying the trait [84–86]. Although
social evolution researchers like to play the ‘phenotypic gambit’ and assume that the genetic basis of
social traits is simple and conducive to adaptation [87], we must remember that this is a gambit—an
opening bet—and not a well-supported empirical assumption. Genetic details often turn out to matter,
and there are many reasons why a process of cumulative improvement may stall, or never get off the
ground at all [82,83]. There is no reason to assume that these variables are generally favourable to
cumulative improvement in natural populations, and there is no substitute for testing the underlying
assumptions of optimality models empirically [88,89].
Note, however, that merely regarding inclusive fitness as a criterion for improvement does not imply
any commitment to empirical adaptationism. We are saying here that inclusive fitness provides the bar
against which the improvement or degradation of a trait should be judged. This does not imply that
natural selection will always, often, or indeed ever succeed in generating cumulative improvement, let
alone optimality, in the natural world. The question of how often this happens is not a question theory
alone can settle [82,83].
Inclusive fitness optimization should not, therefore, be taken as an unchallenged foundation for
projects in behavioural ecology. It should be regarded as an empirical conjecture that may hold in some
populations some of the time, but not in all populations all of the time. I do not think this concession
undermines inclusive fitness theory in any significant way. It should, however, spur us to investigate the
special features of those ‘paradigm Darwinian populations’ (in Godfrey-Smith’s terminology) in which
cumulative improvement does reliably occur [86].
5.2. Another extreme
Allen et al. [7] write that ‘There is no universal design principle . . . [and] no universal maximands or
design principles are needed to understand the evolution of social behavior’. If the intended emphasis is
on the term universal, and if Allen et al. are happy to grant a role for design principles with circumscribed
domains of application, I find little to disagree with here. But I suspect they are expressing a broader
scepticism about the use of ‘design thinking’ in social evolution research—that is, scepticism about
the general strategy of attempting to understand behaviour by looking for a ‘design objective’ the
behaviour promotes.
By contrast, I maintain there is a legitimate, though circumscribed, role for design thinking in the
study of social evolution. The gradualist’s dictum, common to Darwin, Fisher and Hamilton, is that,
when we find a complex adaptation, we should infer that it has been produced by a process of cumulative
adaptive evolution in which small incremental improvements were favoured, and not by the sudden
appearance of a hopeful monster followed by a single-step selection process. But note that the concept
of improvement is indispensable to an understanding of this process: the fact that natural selection
systematically favours improvements to the phenotype is what makes the process cumulative and the end
products adaptive. Note, moreover, that the notion of improvement is unintelligible without a standard
with respect to which improvement is to be judged, and that inclusive fitness provides the appropriate
standard (§4). To be a gradualist is therefore to acknowledge a place in evolutionary biology for a limited
form of design thinking, based around the concept of improvement, and a legitimate place for inclusive
fitness as the fitness concept with respect to which an improvement is defined.
5.3. The way forward
There is a special type of evolutionary process—the gradual assembly of complex adaptation through the
accumulation of small improvements—with respect to which a form of design thinking is appropriate.
In this special context, as noted in §4, inclusive fitness has a special role as the criterion for improvement.
This is not to endorse a universal design principle. Theory alone cannot tell us how often, if ever, natural
selection leads to cumulative improvement, let alone optimality, and such a process is not to be expected
in all populations at all times. However, the existence of complex adaptations is not in doubt, and this
indicates that natural selection has succeeded in generating cumulative improvement in at least some
cases. These cases hold a special (and understandable) fascination for behavioural ecologists in the
Hamiltonian tradition, which helps explain and justify their continuing attachment to the concept of
inclusive fitness.
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6. Conclusion
In attempting to reconcile the two camps in the inclusive fitness controversy, I hope to have arrived
at a synthesis that does justice to the insights of both sides, and not merely at an awkward
compromise. Hamilton’s rule in its regression-based form—a statistical, population-level result—has
genuine predictive and explanatory limitations, but it remains valuable as an organizing framework
for social evolution research. There is room for a productive debate regarding its relative value in
comparison to other possible organizing frameworks, such as multilevel selection theory; and progress
on this issue can be made by identifying the properties we value in an organizing framework and by
evaluating the extent to which different frameworks possess these properties.
Meanwhile, inclusive fitness—which, for Hamilton, was a causal property of an individual
organism—relies on the assumptions of fitness additivity and actor’s control. These assumptions are
reasonable approximations given a specific type of weak selection. There is room for productive debate
about whether (as the critics suggest) weak selection represents a far-fetched case of little biological
interest, or whether (as Hamilton and his defenders would have it) it is the process through which
complex adaptation is cumulatively assembled. If the latter is correct, then inclusive fitness has a special
role to play as a criterion for improvement, and this licenses a limited form of design thinking.
This short paper has not aimed to settle these debates. But I hope to have shown that the differences
between the two sides are not irresolvable, and that productive debate on these issues is possible.
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